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PRECIS
LeCanada et les Etats-Unis viennent d'entreprendre une rMorme de
grande envergure de leurs regimes fiscaux. En ce qui concerne I'impet
sur les societes, la reforms fiscale a eu pour eftet de reduire les taux
d'imposition, d'elarqir I'assiette de leur lrnpot et de reduire ou eliminer "'.
certaines mesures incitatives telles que le credit d'irnpot a
I'investissement.
L'article examine I'importance pour le Canada des reforrnes de
l'irnpot sur les societes dans les deux pays. En recourant au concept du
taux reel effectif d'imposition marginal sur les nouveaux
investissements, I'auteur analyse I'eftet des changements sur la taille et
la distribution du fardeau de l'impot sur les societes dans chaque pays,
en assumant diverses hypotheses quant au taux de !'inflation et la
mesure dans laquelle I'investissement est finance par I'emprunt.
La concurrence entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis est la plus intense
dans le secteur de la fabrication, et c'est la que les taux reels eftectifs de
l'impot sur les societes possedent probablement le plus grand potentiel
d'influencer l'ernplacernent des investissements et de I'emploi. Avant la
reforms fiscale, le taux reel eftectif de I'irnpot sur les investissements en
machines et en equipernent pour la fabrication etait conslderablemsnt
moindre au Canada qu'aux Etats-Unis. Apres la reforrne toutefois
I'avantage du Canada se trouve reduit considerablernent, et il diminue a
mesure qu'augmente le financement par emprunt. En fait, sans les
stimulants fiscaux pour les investissements introduits par l'Ontario et le
Quebec en 1988, la position fiscale favorable du Canada dans le secteur
crucial des investissements en machines et en equipement pour la
fabrication aurait pu etre entierernent annihilee,
La reforms fiscale a par contre auqrnente de facon significative le.
taux reel eftectif de l'irnpot sur les investissements finances par actions ,11
dans le secteur de la construction non residentielle aux Etats-Unis, mais '! i!
non au Canada. Dans ce secteur la reforms fiscale a transforms ce qui, 'f ~I
I
I
i
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etaitun avantage fiscal pour les Etats-Unis en un avantage pour le
Canada.
Entenant compte des taux reels effectifs de l'irnpot, ponderes
adequatement, a la fois pour les investissements en machines et en
equipement et pour les investissements dans la construction non
residentielle, I'effet global de la reforms fiscale dans les deux pays a ete
dereduire legerement I'avantage fiscal du Canada dans le secteur de la
fabrication. Cet avantage demeure cependant substantiel. L'analyse '
soulevedeux questions importantes. Tout d'abord, que lies sont les
consequencesdu fait que les efforts du gouvernement federal pour
reduire les mesures incitatives en faveur des investissements en
machineset equipernent pour la fabrication ont par la suite ete entraves ,
pardes provinces desireuses de restaurer leur position preferentielle
dansle secteur de la fabrication? Deuxiemernent, etant donne que l'un
desprincipaux arguments a la base de I'ensemble de la reforrne fiscale
auCanada etait de reduire la distorsion dans la repartition des
ressourcesprovoquee par l'impot en rsduisant ou en elirninant des
stimulants fiscaux speciaux, pourquoi la reforrne a-t-elle en fait
augmente la valeur relative du credit d'irnpot a I'investissement dans la
regionAtlantique?
ABSTRACT
BothCanada and the United States have recently undertaken
comprehensive reforms of their tax systems. In the case of the
corporate tax, the main thrust of the reforms has been to lower tax
rates,broaden the tax base, and curtail or eliminate incentives such as
investment tax credits.
This article examines the significance for Canada of the corporate tax
reforms in both countries. It uses the concept of the marginal real
effectivetax rate on new investment to analyze the impact of the
corporate tax changes on the size and distribution of the corporate tax
burdenin each country, given various assumptions about the rate of
inflation and the extent to which investment is debt financed.
It is in the manufacturing sector that competition between Canada
andthe United States is most intense and that real effective corporate
tax rates probably have their greatest potential impact on the location
of investment and employment. Before tax reform, the real effective tax
rateon manufacturing investment in machinery and equipment in
Canadawas considerably lower than the rate in the United States.
Undert,he post-reform regime, however, Canada's advantage is
significantly smaller and decreases as the degree of debt financing
increases.Indeed, in the absence of the investment incentives
introduced by Ontario and Quebec in 1988, Canada's favourable tax
position in the critical area of manufacturing investment in machinery
andequipment would be lost altogether.
In contrast, tax reform has significantly increased the real effective
taxrate on equity-financed investment in non-residential construction in
May-June /989/mai-juin /989
676 CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL/REVUE FlSCALE CANADIENNE
the United States, but not the rate in Canada. In this case, tax reform
has transformed what was a tax advantage for the United States into an
advantage for Canada. .
The overall effect of tax reform in the two countries, given the real
effective tax rates, appropriately weighted, for both investment in
machinery and equipment and investment in non-residential
construction, has been to slightly reduce Canada's tax advantage in the', '
manufacturing sector. This advantage is still a substantial one,
however. Two important questions emerge from the analysis. First,
what are the implications of the factthat federal efforts to reduce tax
incentives for manufacturing investment in machinery and equipment
have been offset by subsequent provincial efforts to restore the
preferential position of their manufacturing sectors? Second, given that
one of the main rationales for the Canadian tax reform package was
that it would reduce tax-induced distortion of resource allocation by
reducing or eliminating special tax incentives, why has reform actually
increased the relative value of the tax credit for investment in the
Atlantic region?
INTRODUCTION
The Canadian government has just undertaken its most comprehensive
reform of the tax system since 1972. This tax reform initiative, which the
government introduced in a white paper in June 1987, I came on the heels
of a us tax reform package passed by Congress in the fall of 1986.2 For'
the Canadian corporate tax system, the 1987 tax reform was the second·
stage of a process proposed in a May 1985 budget discussion paper and
begun in the February 1986 budget. 3 The main thrust of corporate tax
reform is to lower tax rates, to broaden the tax base, and to curtail or
eliminate incentives such as investment tax credits.
This article considers how the recent corporate tax changes will affect.
the size of the corporate tax burden and its distribution among broad
sectors and regions in Canada." In particular, it considers changes in the
distribution of corporate taxes between the manufacturing and non- I
manufacturing sectors, between large and small business, and between
the Atlantic region and the rest of the country. The article also compares
the impact of the corporate tax changes in Canada with the impact of the
changes in the United States. The analysis uses the concept of the.
ICanada, Department of Finance, The White Paper: Tax Reform
department, June 18, 1987), referred to herein as "the white paper."
2Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. no 99-514100 star, 20'58 (1986).
3Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Papers, The Corporate Income Tax System: A
Direction for Change, May 1985. .I
4The present article updates and refines the analysis of proposed corporate tax changes
presented in an earlier article. See Patrick Grady, "The Recent Corporate Income Tax Refonn
Proposals in Canada and the United States" (January-February 1986), 34 Canadian TaftJournal 111-28. '
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Table 1 Provincial Tax Rates Used in Calculating Weighted
Corporate Tax Rates~=========================================
Province
Large
non-
manufacturing
Small
Large non-
manufacturing manufacturing
Small
manufacturing
percent
Atlantic region 15.6 15.6 9.7 \ 9.6
Newfoundland .... 16.0 16.0 10.0 10.0
Prince Edward
Island .......... 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0
Nova Scotia ...... 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0
New Brunswick ... 16.0 16.0 9.0 9.0
Non-Atlantic region ... 13.4 11.8 7.0 7.3
Quebec . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 5.9 3.2 3.2
Ontario ..... , .... 15.5 14.5 10.0 10.0
Manitoba ........ 17.0 17.0 10.0 10.0
Saskatchewan ..... 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0
Alberta ....... , .. 15.0 9.0 5.0 0.0
British Columbia .. 15.0 15.0 9.0 9.0
Note: Atlantic and non-Atlantic-region tax rates are weighted averages of the provincial
rates. The weights are based on the ratios of non-manufacturing income and manufacturing
income to total income for both large and small corporations.
marginal real effective tax rate on investment. This rate is a measure of
the disincentive that corporate taxes pose for investment; it takes into
account the offsetting effects of statutory tax rates on the one hand and
fast write-offs and tax credits on the other. I conduct the analysis under a
variety of assumptions about the rate of inflation and the extent to which
the investment is debt-financed. The analysis raises some important
issues that I discuss briefly in the concluding section of the article.
THE CANADIAN CORPORATE TAX REFORM AND
REAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
Tax reform has reduced the federal corporate tax rate from 36 to 28
percent, the small business rate from 15 to 12 percent, and the rate for
manufacturing and processing from 30 to·23 percent; it has also increased
the rate for small manufacturing corporations from 10 to 12 percent. The
overall corporate tax rate is the sum of the federal rate and the provincial
rate. Table I shows the provincial tax rates that I have used in calculating
marginal real effective tax rates on investment; they are the provincial
rates that were in effect after the 1988 round of provincial budgets. The
structure of provincial corporate tax rates exhibits the following notewor-
thy features:
• In all provinces, the rate is higher for large corporations than it is for
small ones.
. • The rates for manufacturing are relatively low for large corporations
In Ontario and for both large and small corporations in Alberta.
May-June 1989/mai-juin 1989
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• In Quebec, all of the rates are very low. l
• The weighted average rate is higher in the Atlantic provinces than it I
is in the other provinces. This state of affairs is largely attributable to the
low rates in Quebec and Alberta, which pull down the non-Atlanti-,
region average.
The decrease in federal revenues that results from the reduction in the
corporate tax rate is more than offset by the elimination or modification
of many tax deductions and credits, Corporate tax changes are expected'
to increase corporate tax revenues by about $500 to $600 million in fiscal
years 1988-89 and 1989-90, and by about $1.5 biIlion by 1991-92.5
The analysis in this article considers two broad corporate tax refonn'
measures: (1) the reduction in the three-year write-off for class 29 manu-
facturing and processing assets to 25 percent on a declining balance basis
and (2) the elimination of investment tax credits apart from regional
credits and credits for scientific research expenditures, The article does
not consider various more specific measures that affect financial institu-
tions, life insurance companies, the real estate industry, and the resource
sector.
Table 2 sets out the pre-reform and post-reform corporate tax rates,
investment tax credit rates, and capital cost allowance rates for represen-
tative industry groups and broad categories of investment. These rates
provide the basis for the calculations of real effective tax rates presented'
below.
Some of the benefits of the corporate tax changes are set out in the,'
white paper. By offering broader tax incentives, the reforms wiIl reduce
the degree of tax-induced distortion in investment decision making and,
lead to a pattern of economic activity that is more conducive to economic
growth and employment creation. Investment should increase in sectors
such as utilities, transport, wholesale trade, retail trade, and services,
Since these sectors tend to be more labour-intensive than manufacturing;
a shift in investment in their favour should lead to increased employ-
ment. Another impact of the reforms will be to decrease differences
among the marginal tax rates on investments made in buildings, land,
and machinery. The shift in the pattern of incentives away from machin-
ery and toward structures will increase demand in construction-related
industries-which, like the other non-manufacturing industries men-
tioned above, tend to be labour-intensive. •
Another likely benefit of corporate tax reform is that the reduction .in
statutory corporate tax rates will make equity financing more anractive
relative to debt financing and thus help to improve the balancesheets of
corporations, Finally, the curtailment of many deductions and investment
tax credits wiIl stop the substantial buildup of unused tax deductions and
credits on corporate books. This buildup has been the source of much
5Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Reform /987: Economic and Fiscal Outlook
(Ottawa: the department, June 18,1987),
I I
I I
1,1
, I
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Table 2 Tax Parameters Used in Calculating Real Effective Tax Rates
for Various Industry Groups and Categories of Investment,
Pre-Reform and Post-Reform
= Pre-reform Post-reform
Corporate Inventory Capital Corporate Inventory Capital
tax tax cost tax tax cost
rate credit allowance rate credit allowance
percent
Large,non-Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 49.4 7 20 41.4 0 20
Non-residential
construction ...... 49.4 7 5 41.4 0 5
Large;Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 51.6 20 20 43.6 15 20
Non-residential
construction ...... 51.6 20 5 43.6 15 5
Large,non-Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 41.8 7 50 34.8 0 25
Non-residential
construction ...... 41.8 7 5 34.8 0 5
Large, Atlantic region,
manufacturing
.:Machinery and
equipment ....... 45.6 20 50 38.6 15 25
Non-residential
construction ...... 45.6 20 5 38.6 15 5
Small,non-Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 22.0 7 20 19.0 0 20
Non-residential
construction ...... 22.0 7 5 19.0 0 .5
Small,Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 24.7 20 20 21.7 15 20
Non-residential
construction ...... 24.7 20 5 21.7 15 5
Small, non-Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 17.3 7 50 19.3 0 25
.Non-residential
construction ...... 17.3 7 5 19.3 0 5
(Table 2 is concluded on the next page.)
May-June /989/mai-juin /989
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Table 2 Concluded
Pre-reform Post-reform
Corporate Inventory Capital Corporate Inventory Capit~
tax tax cost tax tax cost
rate credit allowance rate credit allowance
Small, Atlantic region, percent
manufacturing
Machinery and
equipment ....... 19.6 20 50 21.6 15 25
Non-residential
construction ...... 19.6 20 5 21.6 15 5
Note: Only half of capital cost allowance can be claimed in the first year.
trouble for tax administrators, since it has prompted corporations to seek
to transfer their unused tax write-offs. Tt has also made corporate ta~
revenues difficult to predict and thereby interfered with fiscal planning.
Real Effective Tax Rates
The white paper contains much excellent analysis of the impact of
corporate tax reform. My purpose here is not to comment on this analysis
in its entirety, but rather to consider the impact of tax reform on the
incentive to invest across broad sectors. As I noted earlier, the means that
I shall use to this end is the concept of the marginal real effective tax rate
on illustrative investment projects. The virtue of this concept is that it
captures in one number the combined tax effect on new investment on
changes in corporate tax rates, capital cost allowances, and investment
tax credits.
The real effective tax rate is calculated by dividing the present value of
. real (inflation-adjusted) tax payments by real income. Real income is
computed by deflating by' the price level the income that remains from
the investment once indexed capital consumption allowances and real in-
terest payments on any debt incurred to finance the investment have been
subtracted. The analysis uses real rather than nominal taxes and income
because in the absence of money illusion it is real rather than nominal
magnitudes that influence business decisions. The real discount rate that I
use in the calculations is 10 percent. This rate is the same as the assumed
before-tax rate of return and cost of debt financing. The calculations
assume rates of economic depreciation of 14.94 percent for machinery
and equipment and 3.47 percent for non-residential construction."
6These depreciation rates are averages of those estimated by Hulten and Wykoff and also
used by the Department of Finance. See Charles R. Hulten and Frank C. Wykoff. "The
Measurement of Economic Depreciation," in Charles R. Hulten, ed., Depreciation. Inflation,
and the Taxation of Income from Capital (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1981).
81-125. For a more detailed discussion of the calculation of the real effective tax rate. see
supra footnote 3, at 127-28 .
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The calculations of real effective tax rates presented here have several
limitations as indicators of the combined effects of corporate tax
changes. First, they are, obviously, highly simplified and do not capture
all aspects of the corporate tax system. Second, they measure not the
overall impact of corporate taxation on corporations but only its impact
on illustrative new investment projects. Third, they assume that corpora-
tions subject to tax are able to take full advantage of all write-offs and
credits-an assumption that is not strictly valid in the case of the roughly
two-thirds of all companies that are only sometimes taxable. Since losses
can be carried backward three years and forward seven years, the tax
benefits that flow from write-offs and credits are not necessarily lost by
firms in a non-taxpaying position, but their value may be substantially
reduced. The reader should bear these limitations in mind in interpreting
the analysis. .
Table 3 presents the real effective tax rates by industry groups and by
type of investment under both the pre- and post-reform corporate tax
regimes. The calculations assume a continuation of inflation at its
average level in recent years of 4 percent. The real effective tax rates for
large corporations outside the Atlantic region reflect a weighted average
provincial corporate tax rate of 11.8 percent for manufacturing and 13.4
percent for non-manufacturing. These averages are pulled down by a 5.9
percent provincial rate in Quebec and a 9 percent rate for manufacturing
in Alberta. The provincial rates in the other non-Atlantic provinces range
from IS to 17 percent for non-manufacturing and from 14.5 to 17 percent
for manufacturing. Consequently, the real effective tax rates in these
provinces, if they were calculated separatel y, would be several percent-
.age points higher than the non-Atlantic-region average.
Under the pre-reforrn system, as table 3 shows, real effective tax rates
are in all cases substantially lower than statutory rates. In the case of
investment in machinery and equipment, real effective tax rates are
actually negative (indicating a subsidy) for large Atlantic-region
manufacturing corporations, small manufacturing corporations, and
small Atlantic-region non-manufacturing corporations. The largest nega-
tive rate is for small Atlantic-region manufacturing corporations, a cir-
cumstance that reflects the generosity of the three-year write-off for
manufacturing and processing and the high level of the investment tax
credit, particularly in the Atlantic region. The post-reform system will
bring real effective tax rates on the return to new investment in manufac-
. turing machinery and equipment more in line with statutory rates,
although the effective rates will still be significantly below the statutory
rates. The result will be a significant increase in real effective tax rates on
new investment in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, because
the post-reform regime will retain the regional investment tax credit, the
rate for investment by large non-manufacturing corporations, in the Atlan-
tic region will actually decline and the rate for investment in machinery
and equipment by small Atlantic-region corporations will continue to be
negative. Thus, although the disparity between real effective tax rates in
May-June 1989/mai-juin /989
Pre-reforrn Post-reform
percent
42.4 44.7
42.4 41.8
25.0 22.3
31.1 27.8
10.9 33.1/29.4a
34.6 35.1
-4.3 11.6
24.6 22.5
10.1 20.5
14.1 19.2
-11.7 -6.0
2.1 4.6
-4.8 18.4/16.0'
9.3 19.5
-27.7 -8.5
-3.4 4.5
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Table 3 Real Effective Tax Rates on Investment by Industry Group in
Canada Under 4 Percent Inflation, Pre-Reform and Post-Reform
Large, non-Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential construction .
Large, Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential construction .
Large, non-Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential cons.truction .
Large, Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential construction .
Small, non-Atlantic region,
non-manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential construction .
,/
Small, Atlantic region',
non-manufacturing
Machinery and equipment " , ....•....
Non-residential construction '
Small, non-Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .. , , .. , .
Non-residential construction .
Small, Atlantic region,
manufacturing
Machinery and equipment .
Non-residential construction .
"Two figures are given for non-Atlantic-region manufacturing investment in machinery and
equipment to show the impact of provincial tax incentives for manufacturing introduced in
Ontario and Quebec in 1988.
the manufacturing sector and rates in the non-manufacturing sector wiIl
decline under tax reform, the disparity between rates in the Atlantic
region and rates in the rest of the country will increase.
The Department of Finance has published calculations of the effects of
tax reform on new investment in the manufacturing sector that differ
sharply from the results shown in table 3.7 Instead of a significant
increase in real effective tax rates on new investment in manufacturing,
the department foresees a slight reduction in the corporate tax rate on
7Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Reform 1987: Income Tax Reform (Ottawa: the'
department, June 18, 1987),45-47.
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neWinvestment-from 26.2 percent before tax reform to 26.1 percent
after tax reform.
There are three main reasons why the results differ:
I) The Department of Finance calculations consider a wider range of
capital assets, including land and inventories, than I consider here. The
real effective tax rates on new investment in land and inventories, unlike
the rates on investment in machinery and equipment, will not be affected
by the curtailment under tax reform of the three-year write-off. B I
emphasize investment in machinery and equipment because investment
of this kind is criticial to the maintenance and improvement of the
competitive position of the Canadian economy.
2) The department discounts the value of capital consumption
allowances in the first year, whereas my analysis does not.
3) The department uses a discount factor that is higher than the 10
. percent real discount rate used here."
Provincial Incentives
The preceding analysis was based on the corporate tax system set out in
the white paper, which does not take into account important new provin-
cial tax incentives for manufacturing and processing that the govern-
ments of Ontario and Quebec introduced in their 1988 budgets. These
incentives restore some of the preferential treatment that the manufactur-
ing sector lost as a result of tax reform. The Ontario incentive is a current
cost adjustment based on the cost of new manufacturing and processing
investment used in Ontario. 10 This adjustment, which will be equal to 10
percent of the investment cost in 1988 and 15 percent after 1989, will be
a direct deduction from income otherwise subject to Ontario tax. At 15
percent, it is equivalent, to an investment tax credit of 2.2 percent for
investment in machinery and equipment by large manufacturing corpora-
tions and 1.5 percent for investment by small corporations. The Quebec
incentive is a 100 percent capital cost allowance for capital goods used in
manufacturing and processing. I I It is equivalent to an investment tax
credit of 1.9 percent for investment in machinery and equipment by large
manufacturing corporations and 1 percent for investment by small
corporations.
8Thid., at 153-55.
9Although there is much room for disagreement about the most appropriate assumptions to
make in calculating effective tax rates, the assumptions I have used here would seem to be the
most plausible. If a firm is in a taxpaying position, it can always alter its instalment payments
so that it need not wait a year in order to take advantage of any capital cost allowances
generated by investment. Thus it is not appropriate to start discounting capital consumption
allowances in the first year. The 10 percent real discount factor used here already allows for a
significant risk premium relative to the current real yield on bonds and equities. It would be
hard to justify using an even higher rate given that the real cost of capital to a firm should be a
weighted sum of the real cost of equity and debt.
100ntario, Ministry of Treasury and Economics, 1988 Ontario Budget, April 20, 1988.
I IQuebec, Ministry of Finance, 1988-89 Budget, May 12, 1988.
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Table 4 The Impact of Inflation and Debt Financing on Canadian Real
Effective Tax Rates for Large Non-Atlantic-Region Corporations,
Pre-Reforrn and Post-Reform I
Pre-reform, Post-reform, ~ . I \1
I% debt-financed 22%' debt-financed _ ;
0 25 50 0 25 50
percent
Non-manufacturing
Machinery and equipment
i9.8 .4% inflation ............. 42.4 32.8 13.6 44.7 39.8
10% inflation ............ 51.2 33.6 -1.4 52.6 41.2 183
Non-residential construction
4% inflation ............. 42.4 32.9 13.7 41.8 35.8 23.9
10% inflation ............ 46.0 26.8 -11.7 45.0 31.1 3.1
Manufacturing
Machinery and equipment before
Ontario and Quebec incentives
4% inflation ............. 10.9 -5.5 -38.3 33.1 27.4 16.1
10% inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.8 -9.5 -58.1 39.4 28.2 5.7
Machinery and equipment after
Ontario and Quebec incentives
4% inflation ............. 10.9 -5.5 -38.3 29.4 22.5 8.6
10% inflation ............ 14.8 -9.5 -58.1 35.7 23.2 -1.8
Non-residential construction
4% inflation ' ............ 34.6 26.1 9.0 35.1 30.1 20.1
10% inflation ............ 37.6 20.9 -12.5 37.8 26.1 2.6
As table 3 shows, the Ontario and Quebec incentives will significantly
reduce the post-reform increase in the average real effective tax rate on
investment in machinery and equipment by manufacturing corporations
outside the Atlantic region. For large corporations, the provincial incen-
tives will reduce the real effective tax rate by almost 4 percentage points,
to 29.4 percent; for small corporations, the incentives will reduce the rate
by almost 2.5 percentage points, to 16 percent.
Inflation and Debt Financing
Since neither the pre-reform corporate tax regime nor the post-reform
regime is indexed, real effective tax rates under either regime are
influenced by the rate of inflation. Inflation affects real effective tax rates
in two ways. First, it erodes the real value of capital cost allowances and
thus tends to increase real effective tax rates. Second, it increases the
inflation premium in the nominal interest rate and hence the value of
nominal interest payments. Since interest payments are deductible, the
effect of inflation in this case is to lower real effective tax rates.12
Table 4 shows the effects of inflation alone and of debt financing in the
context of inflation on pre- and post-reform real effective. tax rates for'
12For a detailed discussion of the issues associated with indexation and the impact of
inflation on the taxation of business and investment income, see Patrick Grady, Indexation and
the Taxation of Business and Investment Income, Discussion Paper no. 283 (Ottawa: Economic
Council of Canada, 1984).
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I rge non-Atlantic-region corporations both before and after the introduc-
~onof the new provincial manufacturing. and processing incentives. 13
I ~he table clearly reveals the tendency. of infl~tion to raise. rea! effective
tax rates in the absence of debt financing. This tendency is shghtly less
pronounced after tax reform than it is before reform, except in the case of
manufacturing investment in machinery and equipment. The reduction in
statutory tax rates under tax reform reduces the erosion by inflation of the
real value of capital cost allowances. In the case of manufacturing
machinery and equipment, however, the lengthening of the write-off
period under tax reform more than offsets the impact of reduced statutory
rates; the result is that the inflation-induced increase in effective tax rates
is greater after tax reform than it is before reform, even if one takes the
new provincial investment incentives into account.
If investment involves a significant level of debt financing, inflation
will lower real effective tax rates. The greater is the reliance on debt
financing, the larger is the reduction. The reduction in effective tax rates
that arises from the interaction of inflation and debt financing is much
less after tax reform, however, than it is before reform, Under the pre-
reform system, given 10 percent inflation, the effective tax rate translates
into significant subsidies at the margin for both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing investment in both machinery and equipment and non-
residential construction. Under the reformed system, subsidies result at
10 percent inflation only if one takes the new provincial tax incentives
into account. Thus the proposed incentives will mitigate to some extent
the adverse impact of inflation on the dispersion in effective marginal
corporate tax rates. This mitigation wiIl, however, stop far short of the
relief that would result from a comprehensive indexation of the corporate
income tax.
THE US CORPORATE TAX REFORM AND REAL EFFECTIVE
TAX RATES
Table 5 shows how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has changed the federal
corporate tax rate structure in the United States. The most striking
change in the rate schedule is the reduction in the top rates from 46 to 34
percent. If one takes into account the average (deductible) state tax rate
of 7.5 percent, 14 the total marginal corporate tax rate for large companies
in the United States has declined under tax reform from 50 to 39 percent. .
Under the post-reform regime, the benefits of the graduated rate
structure wilI be phased out as taxable income increases from $100,000
to $335,000; an effective marginal tax rate of 39 percent will apply to
income in this range. .
Mav-June 1989/mai-juin 1989
13The table shows the real effective tax rates for illustrative cases where the proportion of
the investment assumed to be financed by debt is zero, 25 percent, and 50 percent. The average
proportion of investment that is debt-financed is around one-third.
14The assumption of 7.5 percent for the average US state tax rate was taken from Income
Tax Reform, supra footnote 7, at 12.
0-25,000 .
25,000-50,000 .
50,000-75,000 .
75,000-100,000 .
Over 100,000 : .
15
18·
30
40
46
15
15 .
25
34
34
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Table 5 Federal Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates in the United
States, Pre-Reforrn and Post-Reform
Taxable
income, $ Pre-reform Post-reform
percent
The reform legislation also repealed the investment tax credit. Under
the pre-reform system, the investment tax credit rate was generally 10
percent except in the case of three-year property, where the applicable
rate was generally 6 percent. These figures exaggerate the benefit from
the credit, however, since taxpayers were required to elect either .a
reduction in the basis of depreciable property by 50 percent of the credit
amount or a two percentage point reduction in the value of the credit.
Finally, tax reform modified the treatment of capital cost under the
accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) for property put in service after
1986. It created two new ACRS classes and reclassified depreciable
property on the basis of the pre-1981 asset depreciation range (ADR)
system. The recovery method under the post-reform regime is double
declining balance, with a switch to straightline accounting for most
machinery and equipment and straightline for most structures.
Table 6 compares the pre- and post-reform depreciation allowances for
two classes of assets that include most manufacturing machinery and
equipment and non-residential construction. I have singled out these two
classes of assets because they are the classes most relevant to the ques-
tion of how tax reform in the United States will affect the competitive
position of Canadian industry relative to US industry. Two points emerge
from the table:
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• Tax reform has retained but reduced the front-end-loaded nature of
accelerated depreciation allowances for manufacturing machinery and
equipment.
• The change to straightline accounting has significantly lengthened
the recovery period for non-residential construction.
In the course of tax reform debate in the United States, the adrninistra-.
tion proposed an almost comprehensive indexation of the corporate in-
come tax (indexation would have applied to depreciation allowances and
inventories but not to interest income and expense). Had this proposal
been implemented, Canada would have had either to follow suit or to
accept a substantial degree of disharmony between the US and Canadian
corporate tax systems. The us decision not to proceed with indexation
made it easier not to index the corporate income tax in Canada.
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Table 6 Depreciation Allowances for Manufacturing in the United
States, Pre-Reforrn and Post-Reform~~~=====================================================
Year
Machinery and Non-residential
equipment construction
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
reform reform reform reform
percent
15.0 14.3 4.6 1.6
25.5 24.5 8.8 3.2
20.0 17.5 8.0 3.2
20.0 12.5 7.2 3.2
19.5 8.9 .6.6 3.2
0.0 8.9 6.0 3.2
0.0 8.9 5.4 3.2
0.0 4.5 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 5.3 3.2
0.0 0.0 0.4 3.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4
I .
2 .
3 .
4 .....•.............•......
5 .....•....................
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
\0 ..................•.......
\I .
12 ....•....•.•.•..•.•...•...
13 ....•....•.•.•..•.•...•...
14 ......•....•.•......•.•...
15 ...•..•......•..•.•......•
16 ......•...........•.•.•...
17 ......................•...
18 .....••.........•.........
19-32 .
33 .' .
. Note: Depreciation is computed for an asset placed in service by a calendar-year taxpayer on
July I of year I.
Table 7 shows the marginal real effective corporate tax rates in the
United States on the returns to most new investment in machinery and
equipment and non-residential construction, given an inflation rate of 4
percent (1 have used the same methodology in determining these rates as
I used earlier to determine the equivalent rates in Canada). Real effective
tax rates are higher now than they were before tax reform-the predict-
ableoutcome of a reform initiative designed to move the tax system away
from accelerated write-offs and investment tax credits and toward a
lower general tax rate. Tax reform has not, however, significantly altered
the system's bias in favour of shorter-lived assets. The effective rate on
investment in machinery and equipment is still substantially below the
rate on investment in structures.
Table 8 shows the effects of inflation and of debt financing in the
context of inflation on pre- and post-reform real effective corporate tax
rates in the United States. If depreciation allowances are not indexed,
inflation increases effective tax rates for equity-financed investments
under both the pre- and post-reform systems. The post-reform system,
however, exhibits less of a tendency than its predecessor does to generate
inflation-induced reductions in real tax rates as the degree of debt financ-
May-June 1989/mai-juin 1989
percent
32.8
41.3
688 CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL/REVUE FISCALE CANADIENNE
Table 7 Real Effective Tax Rates on Investment in Manufacturing
in the United States Under 4 Percent Inflation,
Pre-Reform and Post-Reform
Pre-refonn
Machinery and equipment _ . _ _ .
Non-residential construction .
18.7
29.1
Table 8 The Impact of Inflation and Debt Financing on
Real Effective Tax Rates for Manufacturing in the
United States, Pre-Reform and Post-Reform
Pre-reforrn,
% debt-financed
o 25 50
Post-reform,
% debt-financed
o 25
percent
Machinery and equipment
4% inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.7 1.0 -34.6 32.8 25.0 9.4
10% inflation ............... 26.5 0.3 ....:52.1 39.6 25.5 -2.7
Non-residential construction
4% inflation ................ 29.1 14.8 -13.8 41.3 36.4 26.5
10% inflation ............... 34.5 11.0 -36.0 44.5 32.1 7.2
ing increases. This result is attributable to the reduction under tax reform
in the marginal corporate tax rate.
A COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-REFORM EFFECTIVE
TAX RATES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
I shall limit my comparison of Canadian and US marginal real effective
tax rates to the rates for large corporations in the manufacturing sector, .
since it is in this sector that competition between Canada and the United
States is most intense and that corporate tax rates probably have their
greatest potential impact on the location of investment and employment.
It is important to note, however, that manufacturing is the only sector in
which a comparison of Canadian and US effective corporate tax rates is
favourable to Canada. Moreover, outside the Atlantic region, the Cana-
dian rates for manufacturing are lower than the US rates only because the
Canadian tax system incorporates various provincial incentives to'
manufacturing that the US system does not offer. . .
Table 9 compares Canadian and us real effective tax. rates for the
manufacturing sector both before and after the tax reforms in the two .
countries. Since by far the largest part of the Canadian manufacturing,
sector is outside the Atlantic region and therefore does not qualify for the
higher investment tax credit available in that region, the Canadian rates,
in the table are for non-Atlantic Canada only.
Before the reforms, as table 9 shows, the real effective tax rate on»
investment in machinery and equipment in manufacturing was considera-
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Table 9 A Comparison of Real Effective Tax Rates for Investment in
Manufacturing in Canada and the United States Under Various
Assumptions About Inflation and Debt Financing-Pre-Reform
and Post-Reform, Including the 1988 Ontario and Quebec
Manufacturing Incentives
;::::::=:
Pre-reforrn, " Post-reform,
% debt-financed % debt-financed
0 25 50 0 25 50-- percent
Machineryand equipment
4%inflation "
Canada .................. 10.9 -5.5 -38.3 29.4 22.5 8.6
United States ............. 18.7 1.0 -34.6 32.8 25.0 9.4
Difference ............... -7.8 -6.5 -3.7 -3.4 -2.5 -0.8
10%inflation
Canada .................. 14.8 -9.5 -58.1 35.7 23.2 -1.8
United States ............. 26.5 0.3 -52.1 39.6 25.5 -2.7
Difference ............... -11.7 -9.8 -;-6.0 -3.9 -2.3 0.9
Non-residential construction
4%inflation
Canada .................. 34.6 26.1 9.0 35.1 30.1 20.1
United States ............. 29.1 14.8 -13.8 41.3 36.4 26.5
Difference ............... 5.5 11.3 22.8 -6.2 -6.3 -6.4
10%inflation
Canada .................. 37.6 20.9 -12.5 37.8 26.1 2.6
United States ............. 34.5 11.0 -36.0 44.5 32.1 7.2
Difference ............... 3.1 9.9 23.5 -6.7 -6.0 -4.6
Total fixed investment
"4%inflation
Canada •••••••••••••• 0 ••• 14.6 -0.5 -30.9 30.3 23.7 10.4
United States ............. 20.3 3.2 -31.3 34.1 26.8 12.1
Difference .. - ............ -5.7 -3.7 0.5 -3.8 -3.1 - 1.7
10%inflation
Canada ........... -.- .... 18.4 -4.7 -51.0 36.0 23.7 -1.1
United States ............. 27.8 2.0 -49.6 40.4 26.5 -1.1
Difference ............... -9.4 -6.7 -1.4 -4.3 -2.9 0.0
Note: Weights of 84.33 percent for machinery and equipment and 15.67 percent for non-
" residential construction were used in calculating real effective tax rates for total fixed
investment.
bly lower in Canada than in the United States if the investment was
equity-financed or only 25 percent debt-financed. On the other hand, the
teal effective tax rate on investment in non-residential construction was
considerably higher in Canada. The advantage associated with debt
financing as inflation increased was smaller in Canada than it was in the
United States.
Under the post-reform tax regimes, real efffective tax rates on equity-
financed investment in machinery and equipment continue to be lower in
Canada than they are in the United States, but the Canadian advantage is
smaller than it was and diminishes as the degree of debt financing in-
creases. The gap in favour of Canada is now less than one percentage
May-June 1989/mai-juin 1989
Machinery and equipment
Canada 91.1
United States' . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83.1
Non-residential construction .
Canada 35.0
United States 54.4
87.8
77.3
83.4
70.1
75.0
79.4
68.0
72.9
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Table 10 A Comparison of the Present Values, at Different Rates of
Inflation, of Capital Cost Allowances for Manufacturing in Canada
and the United States, Pre- and Post-Reform
Pre-reform
rate of inflation
Post-reform
rate of inflation
0% 4% 10% 0% 4%
Cents per dollar of investment
27.6
44.7
21.2
35.4
35.0
31.9
27.6
23.5
Vol. 37, No. 3/Vol. 37, n° 3
point for investment in machinery and equipment that is 50 percent debt-
financed. In contrast, the real effective tax rate on equity-financed invest-
ment in non-residential construction has increased significantly in the
United States but not in Canada. In this case, tax reform has transfonned
a gap in favour of the United States into a gap in favour of Canada.
In order to measure the gap between the overall Canadian and US real
effective tax. rates, it is necessary to assign weights to each of the two
basic categories of investment in proportion to each category's share of
total investment. Given that 84 percent of investment in Canada is In
machinery and equipment and 16 percent is in non-residential construc-
tion, and given 4 percent inflation, the gap between the weighted Cana-
dian and US marginal real effective tax rates on equity-financed
investment was 5.7 percentage points in Canada's favour before tax.
reform and is now 3.8 percentage points. Thus, although tax reform has
slightly reduced Canada's tax advantage in the manufacturing sector, this"
advantage is still significant in the case of equity-financed investment. As
table 9 shows, the advantage lies with Canada in the case of debt-
financed investment as well.
The fact that the increase in real effective tax rates on manufacturing
investment in machinery and equipment is slightly greater in Canada than
it is in the United States is the result of offsetting factors. On the one
hand, the applicable statutory rate is lower in Canada than it is in the
United States (34.8 percent in Canada, including an average provincial
tax of 11.8 percent, and 39 percent in the United States, including "an
average state tax of 7.5 percent). On the other hand, Canada's replace-
ment of the three-year write-off for manufacturing investment in ma-
chinery and equipment with a 25 percent capital cost allowance rate has
increased effective tax rates by far more than has the United States'
replacement of the five-year 150 percent declining balance write-off with
a seven-year double declining balance write-off. The fact that under the
reformed us system taxpayers have the option of switching to straightline.
inventory accounting further increases the attractiveness of US capital .
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ost allowances for machinery and equipment relative to Canadian
Jlowances.
Table 10 shows how tax reform has changed the present value of de-
reciation allowances in Canada and the United States, given different
Pssumedrates of inflation. Before tax reform, the present value of capital
~ostallowances for manufacturing machinery and equipment was greater
inCanada than it was in the United States. Tax reform has produced a
substantial reduction in the present value of the Canadian all~wances but
onlya slight reduction in the present value of the US allowances. In the
case of non-residential construction, the present value of -capital cost
allowances before tax reform was lower in Canada than it was in the
UnitedStates. Tax reform has reversed this situation.
The new incentives for manufacturing investment in Ontario and
Quebec have moderated the increase in real effective tax rates o~
manufacturing investment in Canada. Indeed, in the absence of these
incentives; tax reform in Canada and the United States would have
largelye~iminated C.anada's adva~tage in the matt~r of real effective tax
rateson Investment In manufacturmg.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis of the impact of tax reform on real effective tax
rates sheds light on two important issues: the international competitive-
ness of Canada's corporate tax system and the system's structure of
regional incentives. -
As I noted above, only the investment incentives introduced by
Ontario and Quebec in 1988 have prevented Canada from losing most of
its advantage relative to the United States in terms of the taxation of
manufacturing investment in machinery and.equipment. It would seem
that provincial governments put more weight on maintaining thecorn-
petitiveness of Canada's corporate tax system than does the federal
government. The provincial incentives are probably a useful develop-
ment, given the importance of Canada's maintaining its competitiveness
if the country is to take advantage of the opportunities created by free
trade with the United States. The incentives also underline the fact that
the federal government can no longer dictate corporate tax policy now
thatOntario, Quebec, and Alberta have their own corporate tax systems.
On the other hand, the introduction of further provincial investment
incentives could lead to a further deterioration of our national corporate
tax system and to mutually destructive competition for corporate invest-
ment among the provinces.
The second issue is the structure of regional incentives under the
reformed corporate tax system. The divergence between real effective tax
rates in the Atlantic region and rates in the rest of the country is greater
nowthan it was before tax reform. Real effective tax rates on non-manu-
facturing investment in machinery and equipment have increased every-
where in non-Atlantic Canada, but decreased in the Atlantic region.
May-June /989/mai-juin /989
Increases in the rates for manufacturing investment in machinery
equipment are much smaller in the Atlantic region, particularly for Sill
corporations, than they are outside the region. The cause of th
divergences is the retention of investment tax credits in the AtIanl
region (though at a reduced rate consistent with the reduction in
corporate tax rate) in spite of their elimination in the rest of the COunt~
One of the main rationales for tax reform was that it would reduce t i
induced distortions in business decision making and improve the alloc'
tion of investment resources. The treatment of regional investment t~l.
credits under tax reform runs counter to this philosophy and actuanl
increases distortions. Given the lack of any convincing evidence of t
desirability or effectiveness of regional investment tax incentives, w
has the relative value of these incentives been increased?
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, .
An issue that this article has addressed only indirectly is indexationl
As long as inflation remains near 4 percent, the beneficial effects 01'
resource allocation that would. presumably flow from an indexed ta 11
system are probably outweighed by the disadvantages associated with th
increased complexity that indexing would introduce into the tax system
If inflation were to return to double-digit levels, however, the arguments. I
in favour of indexing would become more telling. Nevertheless, at least i
for the present, it was probably appropriate that tax reform did not i
include the introduction of comprehensive indexation. .' I
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